File Name: ethnic issues and national integration in pakistan .zip
Nation-building is constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. According to Harris Mylonas , "Legitimate authority in modern national states is connected to popular rule, to majorities. Nation-building is the process through which these majorities are constructed. Nation builders are those members of a state who take the initiative to develop the national community through government programs, including military conscription and national content mass schooling.
An ethnic conflict is a conflict between two or more contending ethnic groups. While the source of the conflict may be political , social, economic or religious, the individuals in conflict must expressly fight for their ethnic group's position within society. This final criterion differentiates ethnic conflict from other forms of struggle.
Academic explanations of ethnic conflict generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist , instrumentalist or constructivist. Recently, several political scientists have argued for either top-down or bottom-up explanations for ethnic conflict.
Intellectual debate has also focused on whether ethnic conflict has become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War , and on devising ways of managing conflicts, through instruments such as consociationalism and federalisation. The causes of ethnic conflict are debated by political scientists and sociologists. Explanations generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist.
More recent scholarship draws on all three schools. Proponents of primordialist accounts argue that "[e]thnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location".
Donald L. Horowitz argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances". Clifford Geertz , a founding scholar of primordialism, asserts that each person has a natural connection to perceived kinsmen. In time and through repeated conflict, essential ties to one's ethnicity will coalesce and will interfere with ties to civil society.
Ethnic groups will consequently always threaten the survival of civil governments but not the existence of nations formed by one ethnic group. A number of political scientists argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity per se but rather institutional, political, and economic factors.
These scholars argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars between them that occur are often the result of political decisions.
Moreover, primordial accounts do not account for the spatial and temporal variations in ethnic violence. If these "ancient hatreds" are always simmering under the surface and are at the forefront of people's consciousness, then ethnic groups should constantly be ensnared in violence. However, ethnic violence occurs in sporadic outbursts. For example, Varshney points out that although Yugoslavia broke up due to ethnic violence in the s, it had enjoyed a long peace of decades before the USSR collapsed.
Therefore, some scholars claim that it is unlikely that primordial ethnic differences alone caused the outbreak of violence in the s. Primordialists have reformulated the "ancient hatreds" hypothesis and have focused more on the role of human nature. Petersen argues that the existence of hatred and animosity does not have to be rooted in history for it to play a role in shaping human behavior and action: "If "ancient hatred" means a hatred consuming the daily thoughts of great masses of people, then the "ancient hatreds" argument deserves to be readily dismissed.
However, if hatred is conceived as a historically formed "schema" that guides action in some situations, then the conception should be taken more seriously.
Anthony Smith notes that the instrumentalist account "came to prominence in the s and s in the United States, in the debate about white ethnic persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot". Whether ethnicity is a fixed perception or not is not crucial in the instrumentalist accounts. Moreover, the scholars of this school generally do not oppose the view that ethnic difference plays a part in many conflicts.
They simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts. Mass mobilization of ethnic groups can only be successful if there are latent ethnic differences to be exploited, otherwise politicians would not even attempt to make political appeals based on ethnicity and would focus instead on economic or ideological appeals. For these reasons, it is difficult to completely discount the role of inherent ethnic differences. Additionally, ethnic entrepreneurs, or elites, could be tempted to mobilize ethnic groups in order to gain their political support in democratizing states.
Furthermore, ethnic mass mobilization is likely to be plagued by collective action problems, especially if ethnic protests are likely to lead to violence. Instrumentalist scholars have tried to respond to these shortcomings. For example, Russell Hardin argues that ethnic mobilization faces problems of coordination and not collective action. He points out that a charismatic leader acts as a focal point around which members of an ethnic group coalesce.
The existence of such an actor helps to clarify beliefs about the behavior of others within an ethnic group. A third, constructivist, set of accounts stress the importance of the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups, drawing on Benedict Anderson 's concept of the imagined community.
Identity cards were issued on this basis, and these documents played a key role in the genocide of Some argue that constructivist narratives of historical master cleavages are unable to account for local and regional variations in ethnic violence. For example, Varshney highlights that in the s "racial violence in the USA was heavily concentrated in northern cities; southern cities though intensely politically engaged, did not have riots".
Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all three traditional schools of thought. In The Geography of Ethnic Violence , Monica Duffy Toft shows how ethnic group settlement patterns, socially constructed identities, charismatic leaders, issue indivisibility, and state concern with precedent setting can lead rational actors to escalate a dispute to violence, even when doing so is likely to leave contending groups much worse off.
As Varshney notes, "pure essentialists and pure instrumentalists do not exist anymore". The end of the Cold War thus sparked interest in two important questions about ethnic conflict: whether ethnic conflict was on the rise and whether given that some ethnic conflicts had escalated into serious violence, what, if anything, could scholars of large-scale violence security studies, strategic studies, interstate politics offer by way of explanation.
One of the most debated issues relating to ethnic conflict is whether it has become more or less prevalent in the post—Cold War period. At the end of the Cold War, academics including Samuel P.
Huntington and Robert D. Kaplan predicted a proliferation of conflicts fueled by civilisational clashes , Tribalism , resource scarcity and overpopulation. The post—Cold War period has witnessed a number of ethnically-informed secessionist movements , predominantly within the former communist states.
The violent ethnic conflicts in Nigeria , Mali , Sudan and other countries in the Sahel region have been exacerbated by droughts, food shortages, land degradation, and population growth.
However, some theorists contend that this does not represent a rise in the incidence of ethnic conflict, because many of the proxy wars fought during the Cold War as ethnic conflicts were actually hot spots of the Cold War. Research shows that the fall of Communism and the increase in the number of capitalist states were accompanied by a decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugees and displaced persons.
A key question facing scholars who attempt to adapt their theories of interstate violence to explain or predict large-scale ethnic violence is whether ethnic groups could be considered "rational" actors.
If true, general explanations of ethnic violence would be impossible. In the years since, however, scholarly consensus has shifted to consider that ethnic groups may in fact be counted as rational actors, and the puzzle of their apparently irrational actions for example, fighting over territory of little or no intrinsic worth must therefore be explained in some other way.
A major source of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic democracies is over the access to state patronage. Conflicts over state resources between ethnic groups can increase the likelihood of ethnic violence.
In ethnically divided societies, demand for public goods decreases as each ethnic group derives more utility from benefits targeted at their ethnic group in particular. Targeted benefits are more appealing because ethnic groups can solidify or heighten their social and economic status relative to other ethnic groups whereas broad programmatic policies will not improve their relative worth.
Politicians and political parties in turn, have an incentive to favor co-ethnics in their distribution of material benefits. Over the long run, ethnic conflict over access to state benefits is likely to lead to the ethnification of political parties and the party system as a whole where the political salience of ethnic identity increase leading to a self-fulfilling equilibrium: If politicians only distribute benefits on an ethnic basis, voters will see themselves primarily belonging to an ethnic group and view politicians the same way.
They will only vote for the politician belonging to the same ethnic group. In turn, politicians will refrain from providing public goods because it will not serve them well electorally to provide services to people not belonging to their ethnic group. In democratizing societies, this could lead to ethnic outbidding and lead to extreme politicians pushing out moderate co-ethnics.
The existence of patronage networks between local politicians and ethnic groups make it easier for politicians to mobilize ethnic groups and instigate ethnic violence for electoral gain since the neighborhood or city is already polarized along ethnic lines. The dependence of ethnic groups on their co-ethnic local politician for access to state resources is likely to make them more responsive to calls of violence against other ethnic groups.
While the link between ethnic heterogeneity and under provision of public goods is generally accepted, there is little consensus around the causal mechanism underlying this relationship. To identify possible causal stories, Humphreys and Habyarimana ran a series of behavioral games in Kampala, Uganda, that involved several local participants completing joint tasks and allocating money amongst them. It was only when anonymity was removed and everyone's ethnicity was known did co-ethnics decide to favor each other.
Humphreys and Habyarimana argue that cooperation among co-ethnics is primarily driven by reciprocity norms that tend to be stronger among co-ethnics. The authors find no evidence to suggest that co-ethnics display a greater degree of altruism towards each other or have the same preferences.
Ethnic cooperation takes place because co-ethnics have common social networks and therefore can monitor each other and can threaten to socially sanction any transgressors. In the early twenty-first century, the online social networking service Facebook has played a role in amplifying ethnic violence in the Rohingya genocide that started in October  and in ethnic violence in Ethiopia during — The United Nations Human Rights Council described Facebook as having been "a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate" and complained that Facebook was unable to provide data on the extent of its role in the genocide.
During —, posts on Facebook dominated the Internet in Ethiopia and played a major role in encouraging ethnic violence. The Hachalu Hundessa riots , in which mobs "lynched, beheaded, and dismembered their victims", took place with "almost-instant and widespread sharing of hate speech and incitement to violence on Facebook, which whipped up people's anger", according to David Gilbert writing in Vice. People "call[ed] for genocide and attacks against specific religious or ethnic groups" and "openly post[ed] photographs of burned-out cars, buildings, schools and houses", according to Network Against Hate Speech , an Ethiopian citizens' group.
Berhan Taye of Access Now stated that in Ethiopia, offline violence quickly leads to online "calls for ethnic attacks, discrimination, and destruction of property [that] goes viral". He stated, "Facebook's inaction helps propagate hate and polarization in a country and has a devastating impact on the narrative and extent of the violence. A number of scholars have attempted to synthesize the methods available for the resolution , management or transformation of their ethnic conflict.
John Coakley , for example, has developed a typology of the methods of conflict resolution that have been employed by states, which he lists as: indigenization , accommodation, assimilation , acculturation , population transfer , boundary alteration, genocide and ethnic suicide. With increasing interest in the field of ethnic conflict, many policy analysts and political scientists theorized potential resolutions and tracked the results of institutional policy implementation.
As such, theories often focus on which Institutions are the most appropriate for addressing ethnic conflict. Consociationalism is a power sharing agreement which coopts the leaders of ethnic groups into the central state's government. Each nation or ethnic group is represented in the government through a supposed spokesman for the group. In the power sharing agreement, each group has veto powers to varying degrees, dependent on the particular state.
Moreover, the norm of proportional representation is dominant: each group is represented in the government in a percentage that reflects the ethnicity's demographic presence in the state. In theory, this leads to self governance and protection for the ethnic group. Many scholars   maintain that since ethnic tension erupts into ethnic violence when the ethnic group is threatened by a state, then veto powers should allow the ethnic group to avoid legislative threats.
Switzerland is often characterized as a successful consociationalist state. A recent example of a consociational government is the post-conflict Bosnian government that was agreed upon in the Dayton Accords in A tripartite presidency was chosen and must have a Croat, a Serb, and a Bosniak. The presidents take turns acting as the forefront executive in terms of 8 months for 4 years. In contrast to Lijphart, several political scientists and policy analysts have condemned consociationalism.
This assumes a primordial stance that ethnic identities are permanent and not subject to change. In power sharing-systems that are based on pre-determined identities, there is a tendency to rigidly fix shares of representation on a permanent basis which will not reflect changing demographics over time.
The inherent weaknesses in using pre-determined ethnic identities to form power sharing systems has led Ljiphart to argue that adopting a constructivist approach to consociationalism can increase its likelihood of success. Ljiphart claims that because ethnic identities are often "unclear, fluid and flexible,"  self-determination is likely to be more successful than pre-determination of ethnic groups.
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The challenge of national integration in Pakistan is as old as the history of this country. Formed on an ideological ground with the religion of Islam as its prime source of identity, Pakistan began to face numerous issues of language and ethnicity in its formative phase. Ethnic nationalism began to be in conflict with religion particularly in the then East Pakistan where language movement emerged as a cogent force challenging those who wanted that the country should be governed according to the ideology of Islam rather than language, ethnicity or place of origin. The Lahore Resolution of March 23, , had called for the establishment of Muslim states in the Muslim majority regions of northwest and northeast. National integration in Pakistan only emerges in times of natural disaster, national dilemma or an external threat.
February 12, in February , Pak Affairs Leave a comment. Federation is a form of government in which power is constitutionally divided among different federating units in such a way that each one exercises responsibility for a particular set of functions and maintains its own institutions to describe these functions. Federalism establishes two sets of government: federal or central authority, and the government of federating units on the basis of mutually-agreed formula of division of power or authority. The mode of political organization unites smaller polities with an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent governments on an equal footing. The principle of distribution of power is the basic reality behind the structural composition of a federation.
Introduction 2. Major ethnic groups 3. Factor for divergence a Political factors b Economic factors c Ethnic religious dimensions d Trans-national interference e East Pakistan debacle 4.
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